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FOREWARD: A LAWYER'S OBSERVATIONS
ON HOCHFELDER
ELLSWORTH A. VAN GRAAFEILAND*
In recent years, increased exposure to liability under the federal
securities acts' has caused insurance rates to climb dramatically
and the availability of coverage to dwindle alarmingly for both the
accounting and legal professions. It has been estimated that be-
tween 500 and 1000 suits against accountants were pending in 1974.2
Although many plaintiffs eventually either recover nothing or settle
for relatively small amounts, defendants nonetheless are faced with
a substantial financial burden in defending their claims.3 As Justice
Rehnquist observed in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,4
litigation under rule 10b-5 "presents a danger of vexatiousness dif-
ferent in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation
in general."' Litigation of this type, he said, often has a settlement
value disproportionate to its prospect of success because of the po-
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The author of
this Article was a practicing attorney until 1975, and the comments made herein are largely
reflective of his 35 years of practice as a private attorney.
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77aa (1970 & Supp. V 1975); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78hh (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2 Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants' Responsibilities to Third Parties, 28 VAND. L.
REv. 31, 33 n.7 (1975).
2 Carleton H. Griffin, in a recent article, describes two cases in which the plaintiffs
sought damages of $3,000,000 and $600,000, but respectively settled for $10,000 and $7,000.
Notwithstanding the relatively small amount of the settlements, the cost in legal fees to the
defending accounting firms was $196,000. Griffin, Beleaguered Accountants: A Defendant's
Viewpoint, 62 A.B.A.J. 759, 761 (1976).
421 U.S. 723 (1975).
5 Id. at 739.
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tential for abuse of the liberal discovery provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the difficulty of disposition through
summary judgment proceedings.' As a result of litigous overkill,
even the most frivolous of claims may impose a strain upon the
financial resources of a defendant.
From the viewpoint of a lawyer or accountant faced with a
10b-5 claim, this unhappy situation has not been remedied by the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.7
In holding that a private cause of action for damages under section
10(b)8 and rule 10b- 51 cannot be predicated upon negligence alone
but requires scienter, the Court in Hochfelder merely adopted the
rule which was already being followed in a majority of the circuits;10
and, because the Hochfelder complaint alleged only negligence, the
Court went no further than it had to in holding it to be insufficient.
Moreover, in defining scienter as a mental state embracing intent
to deceive, manipulate or defraud, the Court recognized that in
some areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of
intentional conduct and specifically refrained from considering
whether reckless behavior would be sufficient for civil liability
6 Id. at 741-43.
7 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act states in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any securi-
ty . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
' In 1942, in accordance with the power granted to it in section 10(b), the Securities and
Exchange Commission promulgated rule 10b-5, which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
10 Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1361 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975);
Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607, 622 (5th Cir. 1974); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277,
1306 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 280 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972); cf. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1314 (6th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975). But see White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974);
Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
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under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.1 Not only does this question
remain open for the lower courts, but assuming that recklessness is
actionable, these courts have complete freedom to determine where
negligence ends and recklessness begins.
For some years the Second Circuit has been firmly committed
to the proposition that negligence alone will not support a private
cause of action for damages under 10b-5. A brief historical review
of Second Circuit decisions shows how this doctrine evolved. This
review, of necessity, must start with the blanket statement in
Fischman v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co.'" that proof of fraud is a
requisite for an action under 10b-5. This restrictive interpretation
was subsequently followed by a number of district court judges.'3
However, as then District Judge Mansfield observed in his 1968
decision in Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc.," considerable
debate was taking place among the district court judges concerning
the definition of scienter required by rule 10b-5.15 Illustrative of
these different approaches are Judge Mansfield's own opinion in
Richland v. Crandall," where he held that "guilty knowledge" is
sufficient, and Judge Wyatt's determination in Weber v. C.M.P.
Corp.'" that deceit in the form of "cheating" or "hoodwinking" is
essential. After considering the wide range of opinions on the ques-
tion, Judge Mansfield concluded in Globus that 10(b) requires "at
least 'manipulative' or 'deceptive' conduct or a 'contrivance,' ""
and that a negligent misstatement does not meet these require-
" 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
12 188 F.2d 783, 786 (2d Cir. 1951).
," See, e.g., Ruszkowski v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 302 F. Supp. 1371, 1375 (W.D.N.Y.
1969); Gould v. Tricon, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 385, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Weber v. C.M.P. Corp.,
242 F. Supp. 321, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213, 227 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); O'Neill v. Maytag, 230 F. Supp. 235, 239 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
11 287 F. Supp. 188, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 418 F.2d 1276
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
Is See, e.g., text accompanying notes 16-17 infra; Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298
F. Supp. 66, 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), modified on other grounds, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973) (to
sustain a 10b-5 suit plaintiff must show scienter, not mere negligence); Gould v. Tricon, Inc.,
272 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (plaintiff must prove defendant's fraudulent conduct to
maintain § 10(b) action); Dack v. Shanman, 227 F. Supp. 26, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (allegation
of material misrepresentation, regardless of defendant's intent, is sufficient to defeat motion
to dismiss). See generally Campbell, Elements of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: Scienter,
Reliance, and Plaintiff's Reasonable Conduct Requirement, 26 S.C.L. Rxv. 653, 657-64
(1975); Note, The Development of a Flexible Duty Standard of Liability Under SEC Rule
lob-5, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 99, 103-09 (1975).
,B 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
, 242 F. Supp. 321, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
" 287 F. Supp. at 197.
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ments. However, he rejected the contention that intent to defraud
is a necessary requisite to a private cause of action under lOb-5.'9
The debate concerning scienter was not limited to the district
courts. Later in 1968, the Second Circuit, sitting en banc in SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 2  held that proof of negligence alone is
sufficient to sustain an action for injunctive relief under rule 10b-
5.21 Judge Friendly, however, indicated in a concurring opinion that
scienter would still be required in a private action for damages. 2 He
included within the definition of scienter "the kind of recklessness
that is equivalent to wilful fraud."2 Judges Kaufman and Anderson
concurred with this portion of Judge Friendly's opinion,' 4 and it
must be assumed that Judges Moore and Lumbard, who dissented,
would have given plaintiffs no greater rights in a private cause of
action for damages.
Subsequently, in Heit v. Weitzen,21 the court agreed that scien-
ter is required in a private damage action, but expressed no opinion
as to whether the test would be "strict or liberal." In Green v. Wolf
Corp.,21 however, the court of appeals made clear that it had "gone
far beyond the limits of the common law in imposing liability" and
would not require proof of all the essential elements of common law
" Id. at 198.
20 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
21 401 F.2d at 863. Prior to Hochfelder, a majority of courts adhered to a less stringent
standard of culpability in an SEC enforcement action. Essentially, the standard applied was
that of negligence or lack of due diligence. See, e.g., SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc.,
515 F.2d 801, 808-09 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). But see SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d
1304, 1316 n.30 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975). Although the Hochfelder
Court held that scienter must be shown to establish liability in a 10b-5 damages action, the
Court explicitly refused to decide whether scienter is also an essential element in a suit for
injunctive relief. 425 U.S. at 193 n.12. In light of the Court's silence on this issue, it appears
that this question remains open for the lower courts.
In the cases that have been decided since Hochfelder, it appears that the previous
standard of negligence in SEC enforcement actions is being retained. See, e.g., SEC v.
Universal Major Indus., [1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 95,804, at 90,916
(2d Cir. Dec. 16, 1976); SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976); SEC
v. Geotek, [1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,756, at 90,724 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 11, 1976).
22 401 F.2d at 868 (Friendly, J., concurring).
2, Id.
24 Id. at 869 (Kaufman & Anderson, JJ., concurring separately).
21 Id. at 884-86 (Moore, J. & Lumbard, C.J., dissenting).
26 402 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
v 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
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fraud in an action under rule 10b-5.2 The following year, the Second
Circuit affirmed Globus,2 1 sustaining Judge Mansfield's holding
that intent to defraud is not a requirement of scienter, and approv-
ing of his instruction to the jury that defendants could be held liable
if they knew that an offering statement was "misleading or knew of
the existence of facts which, if disclosed, would have shown it to be
misleading."30
Following Globus, serious ambiguities surrounding the mean-
ing of scienter continued to cause problems in the district courts.3 1
In 1972, however, Judge Timbers provided some interpretive assis-
tance in Leasco Corp. v. Taussig3 2 He declared that "mere negli-
gence is insufficient; there must be a showing of knowledge of falsity
or reckless disregard for the truth." More significantly, a flurry of
activity by the Second Circuit in 1973 indicated that a solution to
the definitional problem was in sight. In Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.
v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,34 Judge Timbers reiterated the court's posi-
tion that fraudulent intent is not a necessary element under rule
10b-5, stating that "knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth may be sufficient. ' 35 He annexed to this concept the possibil-
ity of an affirmative duty of disclosure, dependent upon access to
information or a specific relationship to the investor, a knowing
disregard of which might subject the individual involved to private
10b-5 liability.3 Judge Gurfein, in concurring, discounted the possi-
bility of formulating a "litmus paper" test of scienter, declaring
simply that "'recklessness that is equivalent to wilful fraud' is re-
quired. ' 37 Judge Mansfield, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, went one step further than he had as a trial judge in Globus,
stating that
the scienter requirement would be met if a corporate officer (1)
2 406 F.2d at 303. See, e.g., SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 462-63 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc) (Kaufman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969).
- 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
11 418 F.2d at 1290.
31 See, e.g., Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 584 (E.D.N.Y.
1971); Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333, 1343-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
32 473 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972).
' Id. at 785.
- 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
5 480 F.2d at 363.
u Id.
31 Id. at 393 (Gurfein, J., concurring) (citation omitted), quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (Friendly, C.J., concurring), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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knew the essential facts and failed to disclose them, or (2) failed
or refused, after being put on notice of a possible material failure
in disclosure, to apprise himself of the facts . . . where he could
reasonably have ascertained and disclosed them without any ex-
traordinary effort."
One month later, in Cohen v. Franchard Corp.,39 the Second
Circuit refused to adopt a standard that would have imposed 10b-5
liability for failure to discover material facts which could have been
ascertained without inordinate effort.4" The proper measure of fault,
according to the Cohen decision, is whether the defendant either
knew the misstated or omitted material facts and should have real-
ized their significance, or failed to ascertain the facts although he
had ready access to them and reason to think they existed.4' The
court equated such a state of mind with "knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth. 42
The Cohen decision was followed almost immediately by the en
banc decision in Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,43 a case involving the duty
of disclosure of an individual corporate director. The Second Circuit
again concluded that a plaintiff could not recover under rule 10b-5
without "proof of a wilful or reckless disregard for the truth."44 The
court stated that the determinant normally would be whether the
defendant knew the misstated or omitted material facts, "or failed
or refused, after being put on notice of a possible material failure of
disclosure, to apprise [himself] of the facts where [he] could have
done so without any extraordinary effort."4
Two months later, Judge Mulligan, concurring in Republic
Technology Fund, Inc. v. Lionel Corp.,46 took the majority some-
what to task for "inadequately articulating" the test of culpability
as "something short of specific intent to defraud. . . and something
more than 'mere' negligence,"47 recommending stricter adherence to
the test laid down in Lanza. 48 Judge Mulligan's comments notwith-
standing, the Republic Technology majority's statement that
480 F.2d at 398 (Mansfield, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
3' 478 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
,0 478 F.2d at 123.
" Id.
" Id. at 123-24.
,3 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc).
" Id. at 1306.
, Id. at 1306 n.98.
, 483 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974).
,' 483 F.2d at 551.
Id. at 553 (Mulligan, J., concurring).
[Vol. 51:239
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"something more than 'mere' negligence" is required clearly articu-
lates the rule in the Second Circuit. Indeed, this is the rule every-
where after Hochfelder.
Unfortunately, the boundary line between "mere negligence"
and "something more" is a hazy one, and the Hochfelder rule could
well be emasculated by defining too narrowly the nature of the
conduct which may properly be described as negligent. Where there
have been knowing, material misstatements of fact, application of
rule 10b-5 is simple.49 Where, however, liability is asserted because
of a failure to discover and disclose what should have been known
or because of a deviation from generally accepted accounting princi-
ples, difficulty may be encountered in distinguishing conduct which
is actionable from that which is simply negligent.
Although it is well established neither accountants nor lawyers
may close their eyes to that which is plainly visible," the extent of
their duty to inquire and disclose is not so clear. 1 Illustrative of this
difficulty is the post-Hochfelder case of Herzfeld v. Laventhol,
Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath.5 - There, the defendants were ac-
countants for a corporation which was attempting to raise capital
through private placement. The plaintiff entered into a stock pur-
chase agreement with the corporation which called for the delivery
of audited financial statements prior to closing. The corporation had
entered into two contracts for the purchase and sale of property
which, if they had not aborted, would have given it a profit of
approximately $2 million. The original audit prepared by the defen-
dants showed most of the $2 million as unrealized gross profit. In a
subsequent financial statement, the defendants included only the
down payment by the purchaser as income, stating that the remain-
der would be considered realized when the balance called for by the
contract was received. This report was accompanied by a letter of
qualification making the opinion subject to the collectability of this
balance.
' See, e.g., Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd inpart and rev'd
in part on other grounds, 506 F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1974); Reeder v. Mastercraft Elec. Corp.,
363 F. Supp. 574, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
50 See, e.g., Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 595-96 (2d Cir. 1969); SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d
486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968).
5, SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968). But cf. United States v. Natelli, 527
F.2d 311, 318-20 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976) (discussion of accountant's
duty).
52 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976), aff'g in part and rev'g in part 378 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
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The district court held that the duty which the defendants
owed could not be satisfied simply by following generally accepted
accounting principles and that if application of such principles
alone did not give adequate information to investors, defendants
were required to "lay bare all the facts needed by investors to inter-
pret the financial statements accurately. '5 3 The district court con-
cluded that this duty of full disclosure required the defendants to
include in their financial report at least ten factual items, including
the net worth of the purchaser, the ambiguity of the contractual
language, the absence of title searches and the fact that the legal
opinions covering the contracts had been obtained by the defen-
dants over the telephone from an attorney who had never seen the
contracts.54
Although the court of appeals rejected the district court's hold-
ing that inclusion of the ten factual items was required, it nonethe-
less upheld the award against the defendants. In substance, the
court found that the financial report was materially misleading be-
cause it was prepared without recognition of the "elemental and
universal" accounting principle that revenue should not be recog-
nized until the earning process is complete or virtually complete. 5
The defendants' petition for rehearing and en banc consideration
contended that liability was imposed solely on the basis of an error
in their accounting judgment and that there was no proof of an
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. The petition was de-
nied.57
While the court of appeals had no difficulty distinguishing
Herzfeld from Hochfelder, this distinction may not be so readily
apparent to others. It would be even less apparent were the accoun-
tants' course of action to be measured against more sophisticated
standards of conduct. Much of an accountant's work product results
from exercises in judgment which are not easily comprehended by
laymen. As the guidelines for accounting procedures continue to
become more comprehensive and exacting, it will be interesting to
observe whether variations therefrom will be routinely treated as the
equivalent of the scienter required by Hochfelder.
378 F. Supp. at 122.
' Id. at 125-26.
540 F.2d at 34.
Defendant-Appellant's Brief for Rehearing En Banc at 9-10.




The Supreme Court in Hochfelder left unexplored the situation
wherein a plaintiff seeks damages resulting from the alleged breach
of a fiduciary obligation. In its recent decision in Green v. Santa Fe
Industries, Inc.,5" the Second Circuit climaxed a series of corporate
insider cases by holding that a majority shareholder could be guilty
of a section 10(b) violation by effecting a Delaware short-form
merger without any justifiable business purpose. 9 Notwithstanding
its holding with respect to majority shareholders, the court dis-
missed the complaint against an investment company which had
evaluated the stock, finding that the investment company was not
involved in planning or effectuating the merger and had partici-
pated in none of the alleged profiteering and faithless conduct." It
is unlikely, however, that attorneys and accountants will be over-
looked in future litigation in this area.
Although the Court in Hochfelder intentionally avoided the
legal morass of civil liability for aiding and abetting," the lower
courts have not been so reluctant. 2 The Lanza court held that wilful
or reckless disregard for the truth is required for aiding and abetting
liability in civil actions for damages; 3 quaere whether these ele-
ments would be required where the claim against the wrongdoer is
based on the breach of a fiduciary duty. In Schein v. Chasen,6" the
Second Circuit stated the general rule to be that "one who know-
ingly participates in or joins in an enterprise whereby a violation of
a fiduciary obligation is effected is liable jointly and severally with
the recreant fiduciary." 5 Hochfelder does not tell us whether coun-
533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 54 (1976) (No. 75-1753).
5' 533 F.2d at 1291.
Id. at 1293-94.
" 425 U.S. at 191 n.7.
e See, e.g., Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 888-89 (3d Cir. 1975) (liability
as aider and abettor founded upon knowing participation in the fraudulent plan); Woodward
v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975) (aider-abettor must knowingly give substantial
aid); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1289 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (standard of knowing
involvement for aider-abettor liability); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d
147, 154-55 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (silence together with affirmative
action sufficient to sustain liability for aiding and abetting); Crofoot v. Sperry Rand Corp.,
408 F. Supp. 1154, 1157 (E.D. Cal. 1976) (standard of knowing participation in fraudulent
plan). Recently, the Second Circuit in SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., [1976 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.. (CCH) 95,804, at 90,915-16 (2d Cir. Dec. 16, 1976), stated in
dictum that injunctive action may be taken against anyone who aids or abets in violating §
5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1970), on a showing of mere negligence.
13 479 F.2d at 1289, 1306.
61 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Lehman
Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
478 F.2d at 822, quoting Oil & Gas Ventures v. Kung, 250 F. Supp. 744, 749 (S.D.N.Y.
1977]
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sel and assistance given to corporate insiders by their attorneys and
accountants expose the latter to 10b-5 liability despite lack of scien-
ter. Indeed, Hochfelder does not eliminate the possibility that some-
day liability might be asserted against attorneys and accountants
in stockholder derivative actions for breach of the fiduciary duty
which they owe directly to their corporate employer. 6
Legislation by judicial decree, such as that which has occurred
in the field of 10b-5 liability, is not only undemocratic, it is also
unpredictable. Much ground remains to be plowed, therefore, before
attorneys and accountants doing securities work can rest assured
that the scope of their potential civil liability has been fully deline-
ated. The reader will have to draw his own conclusions as to what
the existing decisions portend. This is no easy task, and one who
would undertake it must bear in mind the Supreme Court's admoni-
tion that, in this much litigated area, "glib generalizations and
unthinking abstractions are major occupational hazards. '"67
1966). See also Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (one who
knowingly aids or participates in fraudulent plan as culpable as principal actor).
11 Cf. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 175 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955)
(defendant, as both director and principal shareholder, liable to minority shareholders for
breach of fiduciary duty).
", SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969).
[Vol. 51:239
